Intentionalism and Meaning
sdownes on Sep 28th 2008
This is a very nice set of comments from Pat Parslow.
Intentionalism
To be a bit clearer, when I talk about ‘intentional construction of knowledge’, I am referring to a position known as ‘intentionalism’. Here’s a quick definition:
intentionalism - The thesis that all mental states are representational states. Specifically, raw feels and qualia, are said to have representational content.
Intentionalism supposes that our mental contents refect ‘intentional states’, that is, content-ful or propositional states. For example, from Byrne’s (2001) defense of intentionalism:
If you believe that mental states – and in particular, sensory perceptions (including motions, emotions, etc) – are representational states, and are expressible in propositions, then you can tell some story about negotiating the content of those representational states, such that there is a shared representation (specifically, a set of propositions) that can be held in common.
But I think there are some significant problems with that perspective. The most obvious is that, if the content of these perceptual states is the result of agreement, then it’s not clear that they are in fact representational. Second, it’s not clear that some mental states are representative of anything at all – that these mental states are epiphenomenal, and depend as much on their perceiver for
I think, in a process of communication, that there is a negotiation that takes place (and we are seeing a nice example in this thread with a positulated vocaublary and discussion of what it stands for) but that this negotiation is a negotiation of engagement, of a set of protocols for interaction.
Specifically, there is no requirement on the part of the participant to agree to any particular representation or to any putative state of affairs in the world. The negotiation, in other words, is not with respect to the meaning of the worlds (in the usual sense, or reference or representation), but rtaher, how they will be used – and even here, each participant in a negotiation may agree to use a term in a different way.
Associationism
I discuss this elsewhere, but it is important to draw out what I mean when I talk about ‘association’. Because the usual everyday sense of association is to think of contacts between people (as in the expression ‘guilt by association’).
At least, that is the sense I take Pat parslow to mean when saying “Some associations are entered into intentionally.” If not, fine, ignore these two paragraphs and start with the next.
‘Associationism’ is at heart a theory of inference:
The position has resolved regarding the principles of association:
I have advanced a position in my own work proposing four major principles of association:
- resemblance – a.k.a. Hebbian associationism
- contiguity or proximity – a.k.a. salience
- feedback or back propagation
- balance, or entropy aka Boltzmann mechanisms
With respect to the present discussion, I would like to observe that:
- None of these are intentional mechanisms, that is, they do not depend in any way on the content or meaning of the entities being associated
- Another way of saying the same thing is that none of these mechanisms are propositional in nature; the states being associated do not have truth value, and they do not embody linguistic or syntactic properties
- None of these result from an intellectual process or contruction – they are natural occurrances, completely dependent on the entities themselves
Meaning
From my perspective, and importantly: meaning is a property of language, and not thought or pereception. (When I say ‘Physical Symbol System’ I am referring specifically to the Physical Symbol System hypothesis, which is a cornerstone of intentionalist theories of mind, and which I reject, but I can apply my remarks to a wider conception of meaning).
That does not mean that one cannot ascribe meaning to mental states. You can ascribe meaning to anything you want; meaning is the result of the intentional, representational process, and as soon as you let something stand for something else, you have created meaning.
So, for example, you could be with some friends around a table, and you’re talking about basketball, and you say, “this rock stands for Karem Abdul-Jabbar.” You have thus created a representational system, and the meaning of the rock is its standing for Abdul-Jabbar.
And once you have done this, you can say things about the veracity of the representation. “Abdul-Jabbar would never position himself so deep,” a person might say, attempting to correct the representation.
But note: some such statements are irrelevant. You would not say: “this is a poor representation; Abdul-Jabbar is much taller and he is not make mostly of silicon composites.” Crucially, the properties of the ‘meaning’ do not allow us to make inferences about the properties of the rock.
In the same way:
We can let our mental and perceptual states ’stand for’ things, thus creating a representational system – but ‘meaning’ is a property of the representational system only and does not somehow become a property of our mental and perceptual states.
We use (descriptions of) our mental and perceptual states to talk about hypothetical systems, but these hypothetical systems have no logical or causal force with respect to the mental states we use to talk about them.
So – when we say, “Let this rock stand for Kareem Abdul-Jabbar,” we are in no way committed to the belief that Abdul-Jabbar exists outside our representational system or that he has any properties beyond those we have explicitly ascribed. We are committed only to a way of talking – which, again, may be different for each of us – and not to some common or shared understanding about the nature of the world at all.
For more: see Quine, On the Indeterminacy of Translation.
Realism
Pat Parslow’s statement reflects a commonly held belief: “Without the consensual reality of negotiated meaning, the network has little or no basis for its foundation – whilst the negotiation of that reality cannot occur without the network. The two are part and parcel of the same overall system.”
Realism is essentially the thesis that these is some (external or underlying) reality to which all of our perceptions (statements, whatever) refer (or represent, whatever).
As you can see from the Stanford Enclyclopedia article, as soon as you try to cash out that belief into a set of constituent statements, it becomes very difficult not merely to believe but even to understand.
Essentially, the appeal to realism in our current discussion is an appeal to an external arbiter that will mediate disagreements about meaning. So that our statements about the nature of the world are based, not merely on agreement (a Davidsonian wholism, say) but on that world itself.
Disagreements about meaning, however, are disagreements about the nature of the world (they are not disagreements about our perceptions). And you cannot resolve disagreements about the nature of the world by appealing to one or another theory about the nature of the world.
To say the same thing another way: theories about the state of the world are abstractions of our experience and perception. We take some aspect of it, represent it in a symbol system (a language, say), and then assert that propositions within the symbol system are descriptive of the world in which our perceptions occur.
These abstractions are what I would call articficial. They are the result of choices we make. They are partial representations of what occurs naturally. By contrast, our perceptions are not abstractions. They are complete in an of themselves. They are not created through some process of abstratcion, some process of choice. They are what occurs, if you will, naturally.
As a general, methodological, principle, I hold that the abstractions are not more real – or more foundational – than the entities over which they abstract. Our theories – as the saying goes – must save the phenomena. Our theories – including those about the nature of the world, including even those about the nature of perception – are – necessarily – incomplete (just as the word ‘forect’ is a necessarily incomplete representation of a forest).
Learning
Pat Parslow says, ” Yes, learning is about growing our network, both internally in our brains (and bodies) and externally in terms of the connections we make through associating with others, but these are both intimately tied to negotiating the meaning of concepts with the external (and possibly internal?) networks.”
This is at odds with connectivism, as I see it.
If learning is “tied to negotiating the meaning of concepts with the external (and possibly internal?) networks” then learning is impossible without intentionality, and learning is impossible without representation. Learning, on such a statement, requires a committment to a set of statements about the existence and nature of an external reality.
I’ve addressed my objections to the content of that statement above; let me make some observations about how this impacts our understanding of learning.
If Pat Parslow’s statement is true, then learning is impossible if it is not something. That the aboutcontent of learning is essential to learning. That learning is, fundamentally, ‘knowing that‘ – and that, indeed, there can be no learning that is not an instance of ‘knowing that’.
This is a theory that presupposes a particular ontology of learning – and an ontology that does not accord with the phenomena, as Michael Polanyi and others have demonstrated.
There are many ways to cast doubt on this teory, but the most straightforward is to pose the question, “How does one know that one knows that P?” Logically, one cannot. If learning requires learning about, then logically, nobody can know that one has learned.
But – learning is not acquiring (in some as-yet undesignated way) some content. Learning is not ‘knowing that’. Learning, rather, is much more like ‘knowing how’. It is about developing an ability, a capacity, rather than placing oneself into a particular representative state of affairs with respect to the world.
Or – another way to say it – one can learn without having learned about something. Ind, indeed, this is what happens every minute of every day as we have new experiences, and as our mind grows and develops as a result of those new experiences.
Let me put it this way: how does one know that they have fallen in love? Is there some set of statements that, upon being true, and being known to be true, amounts to knowing that one is in love? That there is an object of love, that sees that person socially on certain occasions, that one carries out certain actions – is this what would amount to knowing one in love?
Knowing is not ’standing in a ceetain representational relationship with the object of the knowledge’. Knowing, rather, is a feeling. It is the having of a certain mental state, the growth of a certain capacity that, once having been obtained, cannot be abandoned.
It’s like – as Polanyi says – knowing how to ride a bicycle. And learning is like learning how to ride a bicycle – an even in which there is no set of propositions acquired, but rather, a set of skills or capacities achieved.
Conclusion
A lot of what I’ve tried to argue in this (admittedly long) post is that Connectivism is a non-intentional theory of learning and knowledge.
What this means is that, in connectivism, learning is not about content. It is not about entering a certain representational state with respect to the world.
Such an account makes the representational state – rather than our actual thoughts, perceptions and feelings – the arbiter of what it is to know, what it is to have learned.
But connectivist learning does not require representational states. It does not require on the part of the learner that they commit to a particular account of the external world.
It allows – indeed, encourages – the idea that people may have different, and individual, accounts of the external world.
Which means that what is negotiated is not some set of statements about the nature of that world – not representational states, not meanings – but mechanisms for communication, protocols for interaction (which may indeed be, and probably are, inderstood differently by each person engaged in communication).
Filed in Uncategorized | 31 responses so far
Ed Webb Sep 28th 2008 at 07:53 am 1
If I am understanding you correctly, which I may well not be, this approach to connective knowledge is radically, irreducibly relativistic. What anyone learns is as good as what anyone else learns, since content is not the point. Is there a paradigm, then, for doing science connectively? You mentioned (I believe) in the Friday discussion that some pharmaceutical companies are trying to do research connectively, and doing it badly. But what would it look like to do it well? Clearly we are not in a Popperian or Kuhnian world with this stuff. Are we in Feyerabend’s anarchism?
This matters to me because I teach, and I try to help my students learn both “how to”s and “what”s. Does a connective approach preclude any type of systematic acquisition of “what”s? Can one inject a little connective learning without abandoning all contact with established canons (for all that one might wish to approach such canons critically, one still might wish to approach them), or are you arguing that this is a radical ontological shift that renders such ideas irrelevant?
sdownes Sep 28th 2008 at 09:48 am 2
> this approach to connective knowledge is radically, irreducibly relativistic
Ed, to make a long story short, what you call “this approach to connective knowledge is radically, irreducibly relativistic” is what I would call “non-reductive.
In my paper “An Introduction to Connective Knowledge” I describe an approach consisting of methodological principles – specifically, the fostering of networks characterized by diversity, openness, autonomy and connectivity.
These methodological principles are similar in nature and status to those that already govern scientific explanation – the principles of parsimony, depth, testability, etc.
That said, my views have a lot in common with Feyerabend. But when he promotes (what is called) anarchism in Against method, I read that as akin to arguing “let’s stop pretending,” because what he rails against is not method per se but the idea that science actually does follow a method.
As this site summarizes, quite accurately:
“The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science.”
So I would ask, what matters to you when you teach? I would argue that a teaching philosophy and practice that emphasizes exposing students to actual scientists doing whatever it is that they do, rather than prescribing some artificial methodology that nobody actually follows, would be appropriate.
As for the engagement of science itself, the practice that actual scientists ‘ought to’ follow, I am rather less prescriptive. I think that, probably, individual scientists know best what approach will yield results in their particular subdomain. I would certainly caution against prescribing a methodology or approach, because any person making such a prescription is less likely to be in a position to judge its appropriateness than the scientists themselves.
Thats aid, the recommendations that one scientist may make to another are (best) modeled in their own practice. My own recommendations to others, for example, as a researcher and educator, are best exemplified in my actual practice than in anything I could say about my practice.
If I am successful as a researcher (and that is a complex determination, made on a case-by-case and arguably arbitrary manner by the entire scientific network as a whole) then observing my practice directly, learning about it through engagement rather than passive observation, is recommended.
(All this exposes the difficulty – and even the contradiction – inherent in discourse about learning. I am very aware that the real lessons I am teaching in this course have to do with my conduct rather than my content – that my content is, in a sense, a stage on which I act out my pretense of teaching and learning.)
Ken Anderson Sep 29th 2008 at 02:26 am 3
Is this statement about Connectivism correct:
“It is a theory without meaning?
(due to the non-representational nature of it)
sdownes Sep 29th 2008 at 03:19 am 4
Ken, strictly, what the theory does is to apply meaning to its appropriate place – to representational systems.
It allows that representational systems – and hence, meaning – exist.
It denies that *everything* is a representational system. And in particular, it asserts that mental phenomena – perceptions of the senses and emotions and the like – are not representational systems.
Ken Anderson Sep 29th 2008 at 03:27 am 5
Thanks Stephen. Your long post and response #4 is helping immensely in my understanding of this theory.
So, if meaning exists only in a representational system, and not in connectivism, then what exists in connectivism?
And, can I only understand or give meaning to connectivism through a representational system?
How do I communicate my sensory perceptions outside of representational systems?
Thanks for your responses.
sdownes Sep 29th 2008 at 04:01 am 6
Thanks Stephen. Your long post and response #4 is helping immensely in my understanding of this theory.
> So, if meaning exists only in a representational system, and not in connectivism, then what exists in connectivism?
Everything else.
All our experiences, our feelings, our perceptions, our reflections, our emotions, all the mental phenomena we usually associate with life.
In other networks, the same answer. In a social network, for example, the messages and comments, the memes, the strong and weak ties, the cascades, the stable patterns, etc.
> And, can I only understand or give meaning to connectivism through a representational system?
Strictly speaking, yes.
Let me cash that out into something meaningful.
It is common for us to say that our senses and perceptions are ‘about’ something.
What I am saying is that this ‘aboutness’ does not occur as a prt of the sensations themselves, but is rather a (theoretical) property given to them from within the context of a representational system, such as a language or a theory.
The ‘aboutness’ of a perception, in other words, is a property of the theory, not of the perception or sensation.
> How do I communicate my sensory perceptions outside of representational systems?
Strictly speaking, you don’t. Your thoughts and perceptions are personal, and cannot be shared without sharing direct access to the network itself (which is currently far beyond our technology).
Communication itself is a multi-faceted process that can (but need not) include a representational system.
If you want your communication to suggest some sort of ‘aboutness’ then you would typically employ a representational system such as language or mathematics.
If you are trying to convey a more direct perception of (the analogy of) your mental states, you may attempt something more emotive, such as music, theatre, art or dance (which may or may not contain representational content).
And – for the purposes of this discussion – it is important to distinguish communication from learning. Again, we come back to that idea that learning is ‘about’ something. But that is only a property of the communications used in learning. The learning itself, however, is not ‘about’ something.
Ken Anderson Sep 29th 2008 at 05:45 am 7
Thanks Stephen.
If I can summarize my perceptions of what you are saying, and what I feel I have learned so far, and put them into a representational system so that I can share these with you for the purpose of further discussion:
- Learning is about learning ‘how’
- Learning ‘what’ is language of a representational system, and/or is a property of communications only, and has no truth in the world of perception
- Knowing is a feeling
- Knowledge is not to be separated from the object by a representational system
- Meaning = representation
I hope I have expressed these accurately, and thank you for your patience in explaining these concepts to me.
A few more questions:
1. Does learning who, where, when and why fit into this theory?
2. Is the knowledge = feeling analogous to intuition?
3. Does a representational system have utility?
Would it be accurate to say that Connectivism is a study of the perceptual world prior to its conversion to a representational system? Would that be one way of looking at this? Connectivism (as a learning theory) is a look at the pre-communication mechanism of perception?
roytconnect.com Sep 29th 2008 at 04:40 pm 8
There are so many different approaches, or what Wittgenstein called ‘language games’ intersecting here that I am finding it difficult to follow.
Bottom line: I think I agree with the gist of the argument, but coming from a background in semiotics (Saussure, Barthes, Eco) I have problems with the way ‘representational states’ are presented (negative) on the one hand, and ‘representational systems’ are presented (positive) on the other hand, and I have similar problems with the use of ‘representational system’ and ‘language’ interchangeably.
Apart from that though, I think I see the issues in much the same way. So here’s a different formulation of what I see as a similar, or even the same perspective on the matter …
1. Meaning is based on negotiated consensus, not about representations of any kind, or representational states, but about use (Wittgenstein’s “meaning is use”).
2. This is based on the radically arbitrary, and yet conventional nature of all signs (long before we get to the ‘propositional’ issues). Every sign must be a member of a language game / community of at least two people, to manage the conventions.
3. This is based on a (Saussurian) definition of the sign, i.e. it consists of the relation between two systems of difference – the signifier (e.g. the word ‘dog’) and the signified (the four legged things we agree are dogs rather than cats, etc etc).
4. That cuts out all the dualisms of whether representations and meanings are ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ or perceptual or conceptual, and I guess it takes a kind of functionalist view of the matter, but within an ecological, or ecological psychology framework, where each use of a sign potentially alters the systems of differences (see above), as well as the people using the signs, as well as the micro social context of that use.
5. It also cuts out some serious logocentrism that raises its head in the debate here – i.e. the idea that words, propositions, etc are primary, and that our use of these semiotics, in practice, is then derivative. (Genesis Chapter 1 has a lot to answer for).
That has to be stood firmly on its head: what is primary is the set of social relations which a community maintains (enforces in some cases too). Words and other semiotic systems are, literally, articulations of those social relations, which ‘reach down’ into the fine articulations of language, mathematics, etc to maintain those relationships (the fine capillaries of the discourses of power, in Foucault’s terms), and not vice versa.
So the rock in the story in question, which acts as a sign and signifier in the story,is just another arbitrary signifier, just as the four letter combination of ‘rock’ is. It might look unusual, but semiotically its standard fare.
Which brings me to another issue: part of my discomfort with the word ‘connectivism’ (although not with most of what is collected together within the concept – if you allow me that distinction) is that it is part of a conceptual cluster that includes ‘contiguity’. And much though I like the empiricism of Latour’s ‘traces’ and Stephen’s ‘connections’, its important to keep alive the creativity and plain arbitrariness of signs, which can be the consequence of accidents, reversals, fantasy, etc. And the stickiness of contiguity seems to be at odd with that.
And to change genre for a minute, the best summary of the issue that I have is:
Mind #1:
your analytic mind
is a sharp semiotic knife
be careful how you cu( )t.
B*A*M*B*I Connectivism « Sep 29th 2008 at 06:02 pm 9
[...] theory, and network behaviour. And then this morning, while trying to decipher Stephen’s Intentionalism and Meaning post, I felt my Connecti-Vision™ kick in to full [...]
Stephen Downes Sep 30th 2008 at 08:10 am 10
Ken, I’m going to refer you to ‘An Introduction to Connective Knowledge’ now, where I address those questions specifically.
roytconnect, some excellent comments, and some responses:
- “I have problems with the way ‘representational states’ are presented (negative) on the one hand, and ‘representational systems’ are presented (positive) on the other hand” — I have a sense of this objection, but it could probably be cashed out in more detail – right now any attempt to respond on my part would be flailing
- “Meaning is based on negotiated consensus…” – as you probably maintain as well, this phrasing gives the process far too much order and goal-directedness. First, it is unlikely that there is any actual agreement regarding meaning, let along consensus. Each of us is left to wrestle language in our own way. Second, as your next process suggests, the way in which meaning is created in a language (thought of as an empirical object of study) is highly arbitrary and random (though we chould probably come up with some useful ‘rule of thumb’ generalizations if we tried).
- points 4 and 5 are insightful and accurate
- “That has to be stood firmly on its head: what is primary is the set of social relations which a community maintains (enforces in some cases too).” – ah, well here we find out point of difference. I don’t want to stand it on its head; it’s fine where it is.
Now if you are talking about ‘meaning’, sure, you can identify an origin in community (though I would allow that a community of one could create meaning) – but this is an empirical thesis about the nature and origin of a certain property in a representational system – analogous with, and on par with, say, the way the wiring in a building came to be designed and deployed. Significantly, it is *not* a story about the origin of cognition, of knowledge and understanding, or of learning. These are rooted in the *non*-intentional system that is the mind (ie., our perceptions, sensations, thoughts and emotions).
This is hard. Because we have two separate things on the go here:
- what happens in our mind
- what happens in language
We use our mind to understand (among other things) language – but this is a phenomenon presented directly; it seems as though it is a phenomenal system attempting to understand itself
And we use language (in which I would include logic, mathematics, and the general process of theory-formation) in order to understand the mind. And as such we have two entities – the sign and the signified – and it is illegitimate to infer from the properties of the sign to the properties of the signified. Just as well, because there is an alternative theory, associationism, which though *not* directly perceived as a mental phenomenon, may be actually a better explanation of mind.
For when we are perceiving language in our mind, what we are not perceiving is the nature of the representational structure itself – for example, we are not perceiving universalities, ideals, and other abstracts – but rather only the phenomena produced by (what we take to be) language.
Ken Anderson Sep 30th 2008 at 10:44 am 11
So connectivism would remove the obstacle of language (sign) in order to better understand the underlying perceptions (signified)? Is this where the value of connectivism lays? is this the point of it, or is it just meant to describe a difference between actual and communicated perception?
Stephen Downes Sep 30th 2008 at 11:07 am 12
> So connectivism would remove the obstacle of language …
More like, removing the distraction of language.
The value of connectivism consists in understanding that our knowledge is the perception or the feeling or the thought or whatever, and not the linguistic representation of it.
Example: learning how to participate in a community – the learning is the participation, and not some description of the participation
Ken Anderson Sep 30th 2008 at 11:57 am 13
Ok. I understand that.
Do you make a distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge?
Stephen Downes Sep 30th 2008 at 12:03 pm 14
Ken, what’s the point of this question?
I have cited Michael Polanyi in numerous places, and on many occasions have drawn the distinction between what he called tacit and explicit knowldege, specifically, between:
- knowledge that is explicitly stated, in sentences, which (in a sense) corresponds with ‘knowing that’
- knowledge that is ‘ineffable’, that is not capable of being explicitly stated, which (in a sense) is ‘knowing how’
(The remaining – who, why, etc., can be interpreted variously as one or the other of these, depending on context)
Given that I have made the distinction, so frequently and so consistently, one wonders, why are you asking me whether I make this distinction?
Ken Anderson Sep 30th 2008 at 12:23 pm 15
Sorry, I missed the reference to Polanyi in the writing you have directed me to: intro to connective knowledge. I do see references in this post. I am stupid, if you will, and trying to understand, and somewhat sad that I may be wasting your time.
I was not trying to make any point in asking this question. You are certainly much better read than I am, and you have an understanding of terms that I don’t.
However it seems in #12 that you don’t believe in explicit knowledge, or that at the least you see no utility in it. Is this correct?
How do we mine tacit knowledge?
Ken Anderson Sep 30th 2008 at 01:16 pm 16
Another question(s):
Does vicarious learning exist?
>Example: learning how to participate in a community – the learning is the participation, and not some description of the participation
In your example (from #12), is it possible for learning to occur in one through another’s description of their participation in a community?
Ken Anderson Sep 30th 2008 at 02:06 pm 17
Hi Stephen. I have completed reviewing your article: An Introduction to Connective Knowledge. I don’t see that it specifically addresses all of my questions in #7 above, but I will read it again and return to those questions later.
In your article I found the example given in s. Truth and the answer in t. Knowing Networks very interesting.
>Wikipedia, much more so than Britannica, represents an instance of connective knowledge – it is an attempt to capture, as public knowledge, what can be observed via the interactions of numerous instances of private knowledge.
Are you suggesting that truth (as per the example) is only discovered through a study of the networked behaviour of the nodes involved in the assembly of the truth?
roy Sep 30th 2008 at 04:20 pm 18
> Example: learning how to participate in a community – the learning is the participation, and not some description of the participation.
Just one comment: indeed, learning is the participation, and knowledge is embedded in the use of language, not in the language “itself” (if there is such a thing!)
The semiotic distinction is between “parole” (speech/ engagement/ conversation) and “langue” (writing/ language as sytem/ formal records).
And it doesnt matter if the ‘use of language’ is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the cortex, that distinction is moot. Very.
Ken Anderson Sep 30th 2008 at 07:43 pm 19
Hi Roy. I feel my language skills are at a lower level than yours, so please bear with me if my I don’t understand what you are saying. Semiotic is a new word for me.
Are you agreeing with Stephen here?
roy Oct 2nd 2008 at 03:50 am 20
Ken, yes. I just say it slightly differently, and I’m interested in exploring whether the way I use terms, concepts, words, Cmaps, etc resonates with what Stephen is saying, or not.
If we use terms in similar ways, or if they resonate (or ‘connect’?) pretty well, then we are probably ‘mean’ much the same thing, and if we find slightly new ways to use signs, and they resonate across a community of (course participants/ users/ inquiry/ practice), then that’s exiting, and possibly progress.
Semiotics is the study of signs (all kinds of signs) and linguistics is a sub-set (although a substantial one) of semiotics.
The basics of semiotics can be summed up in a few simple ways:
1. Meaning is use (Wittgenstein – a linguistic philosopher)
2. Every use becomes a sign of itself (Barthes – semiotician)
3. If its not possible to use it to lie, its not a sign (Eco – semiotician).
In more practical terms, all signs are defined not as ‘things’ but as ‘relationships’ – between two systems of differences – the differences we make in what we are referring to: dogs, rather than cats, rather than wolves (etc), and the differences we make in what we use to refer to those things/ concepts/ feelings: ‘dog’, ‘Poodle’, ‘hound’, ‘pet’, ‘food’ etc.
The interesting things is that in principle the differences we make in both systems are arbitrary (in the sense that they could be very different, there are limits), but at the same time they have to be conventional (in the sense that there has to be a community that uses the sign (dog) to link a series of sounds (three in this case) in a particular order (not ‘g-o-d’) to refer to a class of four legged domesticated decendants of wolves which some communities would also class as food, and some would not.
I was told of a menu item in Nigeria, ‘404′ which referred to road kill, which includes dogs – the Peugeot 404 was the most popular car on the roads in that region. The person telling me the story chose something else on the menu.
David Andrew Oct 2nd 2008 at 07:25 am 21
Is it possible for someone to participate in a community without knowing what they are doing?
Stephen Downes Oct 2nd 2008 at 08:50 am 22
> knowledge is embedded in the use of language, not in the language “itself”
I would want to say perhaps that knowledge is *reflected* in the use of langauge, not that it *is* use.
Otherwise, knowledge becomes essentially a set of dispositions (a la Ryle). Which isn’t what I believe.
Stephen Downes Oct 2nd 2008 at 11:00 am 23
> Is it possible for someone to participate in a community without knowing what they are doing?
Sure, of course. But they would appear in that community as though they were socially inept – they would be using words incorrectly, behaving in manners though to be rude, etc.
Ken Anderson Oct 2nd 2008 at 01:12 pm 24
Hmmm. I think then that I may qualify for the “participate without knowing what I am doing” moniker!
Ken Anderson Oct 2nd 2008 at 01:48 pm 25
>I would want to say perhaps that knowledge is *reflected* in the use of langauge, not that it *is* use.
…thinking….. Allowing the simple side of me to show:
Is language a means of connection?
x28’s new Blog » Blog Archive » CCK08 My position on Connectivism Oct 2nd 2008 at 03:31 pm 26
[...] If we see it as a border case of connective knowledge like the rectangle is a border case of a parallelogram, then, of course, we could still insist on the dictum that a rectangle is not parallelogram, and that this simple case is not knowledge, but it is not too important, IMO. As I understood it, connectivism allows for the special case, at least it “allows that representational systems – and hence, meaning – exist” (Downes). [...]
CCK08: Reflection for Week 3 « Memeospheric Pressure Oct 2nd 2008 at 04:00 pm 27
[...] Downes’ recent post on Intentionalism and Meaning, he describes Connectivism as a “non-intentional theory of learning and knowledge.” Both [...]
Geoff Cain Oct 2nd 2008 at 08:01 pm 28
I am running into a lot of phrases in this course that I am uncomfortable with. People here seem to think it fine when someone writes “a reading of modern epistemology shows that…” or “Polyani demonstrates that…” or “The basics of semiotics can be summed up in a few simple ways…” Any one of those statements are up for radically different interpretations. I was at a philosophy conference once where they (some of the biggest names in philosophy) spent four days violently arguing the definition of “qualia.” There seems to be a lot of free adaptation of conflicting systems of philosophical thought and criticism around Connectivism. At one point you were saying that there is no pedagogy, then to what end is all of this philosophical speculation? Some participants in this course may really think that semiotics can be simply defined in three phrases – is this what you want? And I would love to be in a room with Wittgenstien, Barthes, and Eco!
Walks like a Duck « Oct 3rd 2008 at 04:33 am 29
[...] of learning and knowledge. (Meaning non-representational, i.e. eliminative, anti folk-psychology) http://ltc.umanitoba.ca/connectivism/?p=146#comments See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intentional_stance I am a simple man, with simple thoughts, [...]
roy Oct 3rd 2008 at 10:34 am 30
Geoff, sure.
I have never tried to sum up semiotics in one or two paragraphs before, but why not try it sometime? I was in a room with Eco for some hours a while back (Indianapolis) and was disappointed. But his one liner (and some of his books) continue to fascinate me.
I think the important thing is to put some stuff out here/there, even if its three one-liners, and see if anyone picks that up, and then respond. If not, plan B. We all need a way in to these debates, and after reading volumes of all three writers, these are the three pieces I carry in my mental pockets with me.
They work for me as what Seymour Papert called ‘powerful ideas’.
Connectivism – What’s Next? « Ulop’s Blog Sep 17th 2009 at 08:51 pm 31
[...] symbols, narrative and their ilk exist, apart from the connect -ionist/ivist spectrum duality? Stephen himself suggests that these are different worlds, co-existant. And of course Bruner is all about [...]