 | a challenge to connectivism |
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I've put a draft of my connectivism conference presentation here: A Challenge to Connectivism. OVERVIEW OF MY ARGUMENT The role of language (Vygotsky) and “objects to think with” (Papert) in learning predate the Internet The theory of embodied active cognition (Clark, 1997) argues that the scaffolding provided by language and "objects to think with" extends our minds from the brain into the environment. I would argue that the sort of ideas being put forward in connectivism theory have already been developed by Clark. Language is so ubiquitous that it is not always noticed. Network based learning theories might be more visible because the network is more visible. |
 | Re: a challenge to connectivism |
| Higher Order Thinking (HOT) is an area which might differentiate Constructivism from Connectivism. Bloom, Piaget and Papert differentiate between understanding/recall and higher order problem solving. George has said elsewhere that there are only levels of understanding. Does Connectivism fail to deal with HOT? What is HOT? Is it really different from connecting? |
 | A combination? |
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I wonder if really what we are talking about are two aspects of the same theory. From the pre-conference presentation, my understanding is a that there is a question of the individual-group interconnection. It appears that the level of connection will depend on the depth of understanding (construction of individual and group knowledge) and visa versa. It appears that there needs to be more focus on the "group" which I am hoping the presentations will address. Catherine Nelson, in her Study of Language in Cognitive Development, spoke of "co-construction" of meaning from the individual child, building on their own internal mechanisms and experiences interacting with new experiences and environments to construct meaning to words. Thus, "mom" moves from all women to the nurturing woman who feeds and cares for the infant to all nurturing women to women who are connected with other children (his mom). She contends that language and knowledge are interrelated, meaning coming from both knowledge (experience, perception, etc..) and language used to express that knowledge. |
| the invisibility problem |
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hi tony and virginia, I don't see anyone claiming to explain higher order thinking comprehensively, as a worked out mechanism spanning brain, perception and the environment. It's a struggle, something we need to think and study hard about and argue some more. In preparing for the conference I came to the conclusion that we don't really understand it (at least I don't, those who do please step forward) and also that "connection" is too simple a concept on its own to do the job. Everything connects? OK, but then what? I think we do know at least about some behaviours that work for some people in developing higher order thinking. Some of this is outlined on the death of genius page of the learning evolves wiki, that 1) hard work, focused effort (effortful study), is most important 2) supportive environment, mentoring is also very important 3) natural ability (genetics) has some importance but is not so important as the first two At this stage I have taken explaining HOT out of my presentation because I don't claim to understand it. The best I can do at this point is make decisions about which approaches seem more fruitful and promising in providing some direction out of which practical advice about higher order thinking will emerge. I'm wary of those who claim to have all the answers given our current state of knowing. This to me seems to be an argument against developing a new learning theory prematurely. Virginia, in my paper I outline two different approaches to studying learning, the Deep Thought approach (throw more knowledge at the problem) and the embodied active approach - the latter being a combination of learning using "objects to think with" and language, including the use of language for changing our understanding of self and private thoughts. This approach I see as fruitful and providing some direction even though more work needs to be done. Katherine Nelson sounds interesting. From what you say her approach seems to me to fit with the embodied active approach. Her book, "Language in Cognitive Development: Emergence of the Mediated Mind" is available on line through Google Book Search and I just had a quick look at it. I think she is saying something similar to what I am saying, that the importance of language in development has become somewhat invisible because of the ubiquitousness of our use of language. eg. "... it is surprising how little attention is paid to language in current psychological theories of cognitive development ... (blames Piaget for this) ... language is recognised as an important communicative tool that children acquire and through which thoughts are expressed, but not something that affects basic cognitive functions or cognitive change ... (blames input output cognitivist model for that) " (pp. 3-4) This is similar to what Andy Clark is saying in "Being There". Apologies for oversimplification, I've only had a quick look. At any rate, thanks for the reference. Now it was great that I could connect to Google Books and read that straight away but I think I had to do some analytical thinking to work out the significance and extract the meaning. |
| Re: the invisibility problem |
| I think you also need to define what you mean by "higher order thinking". Is there just two choices or is there a continuum that depends on the types of stimuli? I think you will find Nelson's work very interesting. My sister is a speech therapist at the pre-school level and she was very excited when she read the book since this is an area they have been fighting New York State education on. They want services to preschoolers to be separate rather than integrated (speech, occupational, physical therapy) and don't want the "play" as part of therapy except where it is a proven method (i.e. social work). |
 | Re: a challenge to connectivism |
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Hi Tony - the higher order thinking skills differentiation arises from Bereiter's critique of Bloom's cognitive taxonomy - (p.94-97 - Education and Mind in the Knowledge Age)...stating that it is not knowledge itself that is a gradient...but understanding. So, looking at bloom's - knowledge holds the "lowest" position...and evaluation/synthesis are "higher order". But in reality, the key issue is of understanding...in terms of depth...not the type of thinking. |
| Re: a challenge to connectivism |
| Thanks, for others, the link is http://www.cocon.com/observetory/carlbereiter/chapter4.pdf |
 | Re: a challenge to connectivism |
| In a couple of sentences, can someone explain what the connectivism is? |
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" In a couple of sentences, can someone explain what the connectivism is?" hi Charlene, George Siemens claim is that we have entered a new stage of technological induced knowledge explosion and a knowledge overflow from the individual into the external network. And that a new learning theory, connectivism, which is focused on these external networked connections is required; that the older learning theories don't adddress this. I would argue that we've always had strong learning connections between our cognition, our perceptions and our environment. Vygotsky's scaffolding for example implies such connections between the inside and outside. Other learning theories, eg. Papert's constructionism, connect the internal to the external too, eg. Papert's idea of an "object to think with" such as logo or LEGO. But George I think would argue that the balance to what is "outside" the individual has now changed so dramatically that a new theory is required. - from "pipe is more important than contents" revisited comments, which recapitulates a dialogue about connectivism on a teachers list |
 | What Connectivism Is |
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At its heart, connectivism is the thesis that knowledge is distributed across a network of connections, and therefore that learning consists of the ability to construct and traverse those networks. It shares with some other theories a core proposition, that knowledge is not acquired, as though it were a thing. Hence people see a relation between connectivism and constructivism or active learning (to name a couple). Where connectivism differs from those theories, I would argue, is that connectivism denies that knowledge is propositional. That is to say, these other theories are 'cognitivist', in the sense that they depict knowledge and learning as being grounded in language and logic. Connectivism is, by contrast, 'connectionist'. Knowledge is, on this theory, literally the set of connections formed by actions and experience. It may consist in part of linguistic structures, but it is not essentially based in linguistic structures, and the properties and constraints of linguistic structures are not the properties and constraints of connectivism. In connectivism, a phrase like 'constructing meaning' makes no sense. Connections form naturally, through a process of association, and are not 'constructed' through some sort of intentional action. And 'meaning' is a property of language and logic, connoting referential and representational properties of physical symbol systems. Such systems are epiphenomena of (some) networks, and not descriptive of or essential to these networks. Hence, in connectivism, there is no real concept of transferring knowledge, making knowledge, or building knowledge. Rather, the activities we undertake when we conduct practices in order to learn are more like growing or developing ourselves and our society in certain (connected) ways. This implies a pedagogy that (a) seeks to describe 'successful' networks (as identified by their properties, which I have characterized as diversity, autonomy, openness, and connectivity) and (b) seeks to describe the practices that lead to such networks, both in the individual and in society (which I have characterized as modeling and demonstration (on the part of a teacher) and practice and reflection (on the part of a learner)). |
 | Re: What Connectivism Is |
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I think this explanation is the best one I've seen on this topic. I'm going to put a link to it on the wiki as a resource. I have a question -- within connectivism I understand that learning occurs through networks -- when I pick up and read a book and learn something is that considered, then, a "connection" that I have made with the author. How does more traditional learning fit within this theory? I am a classroom teacher, but I'd really like to understand this theory because I believe it brings in some things that I believe are left out of many modern day learning strategies taught to teachers. I have witnessed the power of what I believe is connectivism in action in my own classroom and I want to understand it. (I hope that this is not a "dumb" question.) |
 | Re: What Connectivism Is |
As I read the messages here I'm gathering a few points in my head that distinguish connectivism from distributed cognition, activity theory, social constructivist & constructionist theories. I'm struggling!  1. A successful network is different from successful collaboration 2. A network is not a group 3. Ideally, individuals externalize their understanding (in a number of different ways?) 4, An individual's understanding advances through connections with other individuals (and with ?) 5. An individual is able to achieve more by connecting with others than she is able to achieve by herself 6. Knowledge (and learning?) is in the connections, which is different from distributed learning across people and tools |
 | Re: What Connectivism Is |
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I think Stephen's attempt in the Connectivism Conference Forum (log in as guest) to succinctly encapsulate George Siemens' Connectivism is excellent. But I think Connectivism needs to be brought home to people through stories told from different paradigmatic perspectives: Knowledge as something acquired "I got George's publication Knowing Knowledge and read every page with a highlighter pen blazing. I've put the document on my desktop so I can reference it easily. To help me understand and explain Connectivism, I drew a network of nodes and put the letter 'k' on all the links, then drew a dotted line around a small group of nodes and put 'me' around that. I'm starting to get my head around it now." Knowledge as performance "Starting from feelings of doubt, I wrote about George's work Knowing Knowledge in my blog. My articulation led me to realise that it wasn't the essence of Connectivism that discomforted me, but rather the manner in which it was presented. By some miracle, George found my post and responded directly to it. The ensuing dialogue has increased my confidence that I'm landing in the Connectivist space." Connectivism: Knowledge as connections "To me, Connectivism probably isn't totally comprehensible, whatever that means. But I'm comfortable with my window that looks out onto its complex landscape. Perhaps I can use Connectivism as an analytical lens to beneficially focus on certain situations. For example, in a project team I'm managing I'll spend more effort facilitating the manner in which members collaborate rather than simply driving their individual and collective output. I'd hope everyone in the Connectivist space could occasionally share their experiences and offer support." (cross-posted on my blog) Comments? |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Stephen, You say "Where connectivism differs from those theories, I would argue, is that connectivism denies that knowledge is propositional. That is to say, these other theories are 'cognitivist', in the sense that they depict knowledge and learning as being grounded in language and logic." Knowledge is not learning or education, and I am not sure that Constructivism applies only to propositional learning, nor that all the symbol systems that we think with have linguistic or propositional characteristics. The Constructivist principle of constructing understandings is an important principle because it has direct implications for classroom practice. For me it goes much further than propositional or linguistic symbol systems. I am disturbed by your statement that "in connectivism, there is no real concept of transferring knowledge, making knowledge, or building knowledge" I believe that if Connectivism is a learning theory and not just a connectedness theory, it should address transferring understand, making understanding and building understanding. Connectivism should still address the hard struggle within of deep thinking, of creating understanding. This is more than the process of making connections. Where is Connectivism meant to sit in relationship to other learning theories? Do we discard previous theories or do we integrate them? If we integrate them how is it done? There is the risk that if Connectivism is seen as a learning theory, while it does not address the full breadth of learning, it will result in poor teaching by those who have not studied it deeply or appreciated its limitations. For example, we could launch into connected learning in a way which which forgets the lessons of constructivism and the need for each learner to construct their own mental models in an individualistic way. PS I suspect that education theorists have a linguistic bias in their thinking. They are obviously going to be good thinkers in linguistic symbol systems and maybe poor thinkers in mathematics, visual or programming symbol systems. For example I like Bloom's taxonomy but am frustrated that he was thinking in linguistic propositional terms when he phrased it. Wish I was smart enough to rewrite Bloom for visual thinkers, but alas I am a visual thinker and not that good at writing  |
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Tony - while my thinking has changed slightly since this post (I'm not sure of the value of taxonomies to explain distinctions in a network model of learning): http://connectivism.ca/blog/2006/02/connectivism_taxonomy.html Connectivism is more than simply the formation of connections (though connectivity is the heart of it). The connections enable (or perhaps more accurately, become) the learning. |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Stephen wrote: "... in connectivism, there is no real concept of transferring knowledge, making knowledge, or building knowledge" Tony asked: "Where is Connectivism meant to sit in relationship to other learning theories? Do we discard previous theories or do we integrate them? If we integrate them how is it done? There is the risk that if Connectivism is seen as a learning theory, while it does not address the full breadth of learning, it will result in poor teaching by those who have not studied it deeply or appreciated its limitations." George replied, with a link which says: "Praxis - at this level, the learner is actively involved in tweaking, building, and recreating their own learning network. Metacognition (thinking about thinking) plays a prominent role as the learner evaluates which elements in the network serve useful purposes and which elements need to be eliminated" It seems that building and metacognition are talked about in George's version but dismissed or not talked about in Stephen's version. With respect to Tony's question I think there is a problem for those who decide to create new theories, in this case a new theory for learning. Either the new theory is intended to replace older theories because the older theories are inferior. Or, the new theory is intended to complement older theories because the older theories are good for some things but new things have come along which the older theories don't explain. Which is it? By my reading, Stephen is saying the former and George is saying the latter but I'm not sure. |
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Bill Kerr writes, "It seems that building and metacognition are talked about in George's version but dismissed or not talked about in Stephen's version." Well, it's kind of like making friends. George talks about deciding what people make useful friends, how to make connections with those friends, building a network of those friends. I talk about being open to ideas, communicating your thoughts and ideas, respecting differences and letting people live their lives. Then Bill comes along and says that George is talking about making friends but Stephen just ignores it. Bill continues, "Either the new theory is intended to replace older theories... Or, the new theory is intended to complement older theories. By my reading, Stephen is saying the former and George is saying the latter but I'm not sure." We want to be more precise. Any theory postulates the existence of some entities and the non-existence of others. The most celebrated example is Newton's gravitation, which postulated the existence of 'mass' and the non-existence of 'impetus'. I am using the language of 'mass'. George, in order to make his writing more accessible, (sometimes) uses the language of 'impetus'. (That's my take, anyways). |
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Hi Bill... You stated: "Or, the new theory is intended to complement older theories because the older theories are good for some things but new things have come along which the older theories don't explain. Which is it? By my reading, Stephen is saying the former and George is saying the latter but I'm not sure." By my line of thinking, I'm fine with diversity. Ideas co-exist in an entirely different manner. I'm a big fan of ecologies - and they house numerous, often contradictory elements - elements in conflict, in support, etc. Different ideas serve different needs. The intrinsic aspects of different views will work in a variety circumstances, even if the application isn't perfect. It is, after all, not about pure application of ideals. We use ideas and apply them based not only on their merits, but on the context - where we're at...where our learners are at...tools available, etc. So, sometimes, sloppiness works. Misapplication still teaches. Our theory is pure in thought, messy in application. And, few things are refuted in their entirety. Many aspects of constructivism, cognitivism have value beyond the language construct we have created to house the ideals. Most ideas are messy, run across domains, and even revolutions bear the characteristics of the system they are attempting to replace. |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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A link to my paper 'An Introduction to Connective Knowledge' will help with some of the comments in this post (long, sorry). Tony writes, "Knowledge is not learning or education, and I am not sure that Constructivism applies only to propositional learning nor that all the symbol systems that we think with have linguistic or propositional characteristics. " I think it would be very difficult to draw out any coherent theory of constructivism that is not based on a system with linguistic or propositional characteristics. (or as I would prefer to say, a 'rule-based representational system'). Tony continues, "The Constructivist principle of constructing understandings is an important principle because it has direct implications for classroom practice. For me it goes much further than propositional or linguistic symbol systems." What is it to 'construct an understanding' if it does not involve: - a representational system, such as language, logic, images, or some other physical symbol set (ie., a semantics) - rules or mechanisms for creating entities in that representational system (ie., a syntax)? Again, I don't think you get a coherent constructivist theory without one of these. I am always open to be corrected on this, but I would like to see an example. Tony continues, "I am disturbed by your statement that "in connectivism, there is no real concept of transferring knowledge, making knowledge, or building knowledge" I believe that if Connectivism is a learning theory and not just a connectedness theory, it should address transferring understand, making understanding and building understanding." This gets to the core of the distinction between constructivism and connectivism (in my view, at least). In a representational system, you have a thing, a physical symbol, that stands in a one-to-one relationship with something: a bit of knowledge, an 'understanding', something that is learned, etc. In representational theories, we talk about the creation ('making' or 'building') and transferring of these bits of knowledge. This is understood as a process that parallels (or in unsophisticated theories, is) the creation and transferring of symbolic entities. Connectivism is not a representational theory. It does not postulate the existence of physical symbols standing in a representational relationship to bits of knowledge or understandings. Indeed, it denies that there are bits of knowledge or understanding, much less that they can be created, represented or transferred. This is the core of connectivism (and its cohort in computer science, connectionism). What you are talking about as 'an understanding' is (at a best approximation) distributed across a network of connections. To 'know that P' is (approximately) to 'have a certain set of neural connections'. To 'know that P' is, therefore, to be in a certain physical state - but, moreover, one that is unique to you, and further, one that is indistinguishable from other physical states with which it is co-mingled. Tony continues, "Connectivism should still address the hard struggle within of deep thinking, of creating understanding. This is more than the process of making connections." No, it is not more than the process of making connections. That's why learning is at once so simple it seems it should be easily explained and so complex that it seems to defy explanation (cf. Hume on this). How can learning - something so basic that infants and animals can do it - defy explanation? As soon as you make learning an intentional process (that is, a process that involves the deliberate creation of a representation) you have made these simple cases difficult, if not impossible, to understand. That's why this is misplaced: "For example, we could launch into connected learning in a way which which forgets the lessons of constructivism and the need for each learner to construct their own mental models in an individualistic way." The point is: - there are no mental models per se (that is, no systematically constructed rule-based representational systems) - and what there is (ie., connectionist networks) is not built (like a model) it is grown (like a plant) When something like this is said, even basic concepts as 'personalization' change completely. In the 'model' approach, personalization typically means more: more options, more choices, more types of tests, etc. You need to customize the environment (the learning) the fit the student. In the 'connections' approach, personalization typically means less: fewer rules, fewer constraints. You need to grant the learner autonomy within the environment. So there's a certain sense, I think, in which the understandings of previous theories will not translate well into connectivism, for after all, even basic words and concepts acquire new meaning when viewed from the connectivist perspective. |
 | Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Stephen said (earlier in this forum):
and then above you mentioned:
With these two points, let me see if I understand what you are stating--connectivism holds that learning and knowledge exists in a system, and not in an individual. Furthermore, a person does not individually learn anything, as all learning and knowledge exists within a connected community, so to speak. Learning is outside the individual, with the individual merely participating in the global conversation where this learning takes place and "lives." Is this consonant with your view, or am I misunderstanding you? |
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Jeffrey Keefer asks whether "all learning and knowledge exists within a connected community, so to speak." Not quite. What I am saying (to more or less use the same vocabulary) is that 'a piece of knowledge is a system'. Knowing something, in other words, does not reduce to something simple (like a 'thought' or an 'idea') but at best can be approximated as a 'set of connections in a network'. This means that, wherever there is a network, there can be knowledge. The big eye-opening thing that got everybody doing is the realization that society is organized as a network (ie., social networks) and therefore that in a society (thought of as a whole) there can be knowledge. Some people (a lot of people, actually) jump to the inference that all knowledge is social knowledge. This gets you the whole Vytgotsky / social constructionism kind of thing. The line of reasoning that gets you there is pretty straightforward. Knowledge is expressed in language ('The world is a totality of facts, not things'), language is a social construction, hence knowledge is a social construction). I reject that argument because I reject the first premise (George, I thing, accepts it, if only tacitly, and is much more sympathetic to the social constructionist conclusion). There are many types of networks, some of which have nothing to do with a language. My cat, for example, wouldn't know a physical symbol system if it hit her. And she knows nothing about social constructions. Yet she has a network for a brain, and hence, knows things (little cat-like things - cf Nagel). Accordingly, in An Introduction to Connective Knowledge I distinguish between 'public knowledge' and 'personal knowledge'. The former is the social knowledge everybody talks about - meaning in language, for example. The latter is, as the name suggests, personal. The reference to Polanyi is not accidental. And as Polanyi Says, personal language is, at least in part, ineffable. Like 'knowing how to ride a bicycle'. So not all knowledge is social. Some knowledge is personal. Indeed, ineliminably personal. |
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Stephen- Thank you for your reply. I have been trying to read your "An Introduction to Connective Knowledge" to better understand what you mean and, as you mentioned elsewhere, it is a bit long. I have had some difficulties printing it (clicking print in IE makes the right of the page get cut-off, and changing the page orientation to landscape cuts off part of the top and bottom sentences on each page). Is it possible to have this text in a PDF format to more easily print and read and annotate? I find it a bit long to read completely online. Thank you. |
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Stephen You appear to be making an argument of the form A looks like B therefore A is B: At the micro level, the biochemical level, learning consists of nodes and connections. At the macro level, the web, learning consists of nodes and connections. Therefore it is appropriate to view all intermediate levels of learning as consisting of nodes and connections. Furthermore, because of the growing importance of the web, this model is the most appropriate at all levels of learning. Phenomena can often be viewed in different ways, for example, light can be viewed as either photons or waves depending on the context. To take another example, object permanence is a lesson so fundamental and so necessary that infants spend weeks practicing and testing. But object permanence is not true at the macro level, the relativistic level or the micro level, the quantum level. Object permanence is the most appropriate of the perspectives at the human level. Similarly, I believe that a model that talks of constructing an understanding may be the most appropriate model at the school level despite those understandings ultimately being composed of nodes and connections at the micro level and despite the external supports, which are of growing importance, also consisting of nodes and connections. |
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"You appear to be making an argument of the form A looks like B therefore A is B." Not in the example you cite. I am saying: 'A has properties x and y' and 'B has properties x and y' hence 'when talking about C, which connects A and B, it makes sense to keep talking in terms of properties x and y'. You are saying, 'No, let's talk about p and q instead'. Our brains consist of networks, society consists of networks, but when talking about learning, instead of talking about networks, you say, let's talk about constructing an understanding. One wonders, why? What is the use of this language - which is in many ways wrong and misleading - buying us? |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Hi Tony - great to see you ongoing involvement in the conference (and appreciated your insights during Bill's session today). I agree phenomena can all be viewed from different angles. The prevailing climate and context is critical. I'm much more aware of gravity when falling than I am when driving a car. So context is critical...and our learning context today is one that is not able to function (at least in high knowledge growth fields) according to views of construction. We connect specialized nodes, instead of explicitly construction the knowledge ourselves (for the most part). Look at wikipedia. I use it to connect to knowledge...not construct knowledge. Now, at this point, we could get into a lengthy discussion of what is knowledge/information/data/etc. I'm going to skip that simply by saying, as I did during my session, that they rely on each other - i.e. if the global information pool increases, so to MUST our ability to see the knowledge within the pool. In some ways, abundance makes knowledge more difficult...and ultimately, I think the connections we form between the information becomes the knowledge...and from that we move to sense/meaning making - i.e. what does this knowledge mean? How should we act based on it? This is, I think, why Stephen talks about the difficulty of "construction" in abundant knowledge environments (he may have a larger view than I'm suggesting here if he does not limit it to abundance). Truly, what is constructed? The connection? The understanding? (doesn't that arise form the connection?). I personally know what it means to connect...but I'm unsure of what it means to construct (it's not to acquire knowledge...does it then mean that I must take what is coming in and do something with it? i.e. place it into my thought scheme (Ausubel)? What does it look like on a neural level? What does construction of knowledge mean if not the connection of neurons...ideas and concepts distributed across our grey matter? Perhaps the question - and this sounds arrogant - is not whether connectivism is a learning theory, but whether constructivism is...i.e. is the construction of knowledge more than the formation of connections (external and internal)? If not, there is little point in trying to fit connectivism into constructivism. |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
This is not to defend or attack either connectivism or constuctivism. I simply want to share (70's word, I know  ) a source that I think might shed light on both. George Kelly - http://www.learningandteaching.info/learning/personal.htm - seems to have disappeared as one of the foundations of constructivism, but, as I remember his ideas, it seems to me that he is relevant to this discussion. |
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Stephen Downes wrote: "Connectivism is, by contrast, 'connectionist'. Knowledge is, on this theory, literally the set of connections formed by actions and experience. It may consist in part of linguistic structures, but it is not essentially based in linguistic structures, and the properties and constraints of linguistic structures are not the properties and constraints of connectivism." That seems to half shut the door on the importance of language and behaviour in human development. I'd like to see an evolutionary account of connectivism as a theory and also an account of how connectivism helps explain human evolution / development. For example, Daniel Dennett's theory of human evolution and development goes something like this: Darwinian creatures are created by random mutation and selected by the external environment. The best designs survive and reproduce. Skinnerian creatures Pigeons can be trained to press a bar to receive food. Skinnerian creatures ask themselves, "What do I do next?" Popperian creatures can preselect from possible behaviours / actions weeding out the truly stupid options before risking them in the harsh world. Dennett calls them Popperian because Popper said this design enhancement "permits our hypotheses to die in our stead". Popperian creatures ask themselves, "What do I think about next?" Gregorian creatures are named after Richard Gregory, an information theorist. Gregorian creatures import mind-tools (words) from the outer cultural environment to create an inner environment which improve both the generators and testers. Gregorian creatures ask themselves, "How can I learn to think better about what to think about next?" Words / language are necessary to sustain long predictive chains of thought, eg. to sustain a chain or combination of pattern recognition. This is true in chess, for example, where the player uses chess notation to assist his or her memory. (more detail and links to references here) I think these views are consistent with a rich heritage in learning theorists that perhaps originated with Vygotsky. |
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Bill Kerr writes, "Words / language are necessary to sustain long predictive chains of thought, eg. to sustain a chain or combination of pattern recognition. This is true in chess, for example, where the player uses chess notation to assist his or her memory." This is not true in chess. I once played a chess player who (surprisingly to me) turned out to be far my superior (it was a long time ago). I asked, "how do you remember all those combinations?" He said, "I don't work in terms of specific positions or specific sequences. Rather, what I do is to always move to a stronger position, a position that can be seen by recognizing the patterns on the board, seen as a whole." See, that's the difference between a cognitivist theory and a connectionist theory. The cognitivist thinks deeply by reasoning through a long sequence of steps. The non-cognitivist thinks deeply by 'seeing' more intricate and more subtle patterns. It is a matter of recognition rather than inference. That's why this criticism, "Words / language are necessary to sustain long predictive chains of thought," begs the question. It is leveled against an alternative that is, by definition, non-linear, and hence, does not produce chains of thought. |
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hi Stephen, I chose chess as an example because I'm a strong player and can relate it to my direct experience. I don't recognise the language of the player you cite as that of a strong chess player, when s/he says, "I don't work in terms of specific positions or specific sequences". This is generalised strategic talk divorced from tactical reality and chess is usually decided at the tactical level. Strategy of course is important as well but by the structure and dynamics of the game you can throw away 40 good strategic moves with one tactical blunder. Even world champions sometimes do that. In chess if you don't calculate your combinations accurately step by step and considering your opponents possible replies carefully, the "specific sequences", then you lose. It's as simple as that. Calculating accurately ahead, sometimes quite a few moves, makes the difference between winning and losing. Every good chess player routinely performs these specific sequence calculations. Quick and accurate pattern recognition of say forks, pins, skewers, double attacks, nets etc. is essential as well but that does not deny the need for specific accurate calculation, which, in my experience, is supported by chess notation, which assists in holding chains of moves in memory. Also chess notation is vital say for someone playing blindfold chess. In reconstructing the position bit by bit, a recollection of the previous moves is essential. You can't do it just by pattern recognition alone without the help of the symbolic notation, which IMO scaffolds the process. |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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This is a longish post - sorry. If you don't have the time or patience for it, then read only the last three (very short) paragraphs. Obviously we won't resolve this particular difference of opinion by arguing who is the better chess player. I will therefore simply assert that I'm quite good and leave it at that. Chess is interesting (and unusual) in that it can be completely described in language. Chess notation is expressively complete of chess. Therefore, for any possible future outcome of a chess game, there is a way to express, in that language, the series of steps that will get you there. This is all to say that what Bill says is possible, that "Calculating accurately ahead, sometimes quite a few moves, makes the difference between winning and losing. Every good chess player routinely performs these specific sequence calculations." Quite right. Just as, in an intellectual discussion such as this (or even a beer-soaked debate about the Colts down at the local) we use symbolic representations - language - to make our point (and at the bar we might even use a salt shaker to represent Peyton Manning). Language is useful and its precision helps eliminate errors. No denying that. The question, though, is deeper than that. There are two aspects to the question. First, do we play chess (solely) by constructing strings of inferences (ie., sequences of moves in chess notation)? And second, even when we construct strings of inferences, is this how we actually think, or is this how we describe how we think? Obviously, each question has a bearing on the other. Let's look at the first. In fact, quite a bit of non-linguistic activity happens in the mind of a chess player. Bill acknowledges as much: "Quick and accurate pattern recognition of say forks, pins, skewers, double attacks, nets etc. is essential as well." In fact, in addition to these simple cases of pattern recognition, chess players routinely use recognition prior to checking any specific series of moves. For example, except in very specific situations, the move 'A4' doesn't come up a lot. That's why chess is so much harder with a blindfold. Because chess players don't just consider sequences of movements. They depend on the recognition factor. This takes us directly to the second question: what are we doing when we are constructing sequences of moves? Are we working in language? Or are we doing something else? What this amounts to is the question: are there actually sentences (or chess notation) in the brain? Or is the appearance of sentences and syntax actually an epiphenomenon - that is, is the appearance of sentences and syntax the way something seems, but not the way something is? You can't just tell by looking, of course (just as, in red light, you can't tell just by looking whether a painted wall is painted red or white). Or may seem that you are thinking in sentences, but that might just be a surface appearance of a deeper process. Which, of course, is what I will argue. But how do you know? Like this: what rules or principles do your thoughts obey? If your thoughts are in a language, then they will be constrained by grammatical principles. By contrast, if your thoughts are not in a language, then they will not be constrained by the grammatical principles of language. Well, at first blush, it seems ouronce during a particularly tough game I contemplated the possibility of knocking the board off the table. There's no chess notation for that! But of course, that contemplates an event outside the domain of the game. What if I am restricted to things that can actually occur in a game? Since every possible arrangement of pieces is described by the language, then I cannot violate the constraints of the language. Quite so. But I am constrained by the fact of working in a language. There are some chess situations - end games, for example - that take a long sequence of moves to get to. It takes a certain amount of time to think of a move in our mind (and not a microscopic amount - we see chess players pondering moves for hours at a time). Therefore, if we are thinking in language, it should take longer to imagine some chess situations than others. You can see this intuitively by actually thinking in moves. An end game with two rooks takes very few moves; an end game with a bishop and a knight takes many more. You can imagine the sequence of rook moves very quickly, while it takes longer to imagine the bishop and knight moves (I'm not just making this up; it is the same move cognitivists, such as Pylyshyn, use against image-theorists, such as Kosslyn - see, for example, Pylyshyn, What's In Your Mind?). But mostly what we do is we imagine a chess situation very quickly - only then do we think of the sequence of moves that it takes to get there. For example, the advice on bishop-knight end-games in Wikipedia says, "white must force black's king to the corner that is the same color as his bishop." Imagine what sort of situation we would be in if Wikipedia simply told us this: "1. Kd6 Kc8 2. Ke7 Kb7 3. Kd7 Kb8 4. Ba6 Ka7 5. Bc8 Kb8 6. Ne7 Ka7 (or 6. ... Ka8 7. Kc7 Ka7 8. Nc6+ Ka8 9. Bb7++ ) 7. Kc7 Ka8 8. Bb7+ Ka7 9. Nc6++." So - I argue - the assertion that we think in a language, whether while playing chess or composing an essay, is an illusion. It may look like we're using language, but that's not what's actually happening. What we are actually doing is pattern matching. We are imagining different sorts of arrangements of pieces and then matching them to desirable (or undesirable) outcomes, such as pins or mates or whatever. An awful lot follows from this, because the mechanisms that describe reasoning via pattern matching are very different from those describing physical symbol systems. And it is precisely that set of differences that characterize the difference between connectivism and constructivism. |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Stephen Downes wrote: "In connectivism, a phrase like 'constructing meaning' makes no sense. Connections form naturally, through a process of association, and are not 'constructed' through some sort of intentional action" Stephen, your position on intentional stance sounds similar to Churchland's position on eliminative materialism. Other materialist philosophers, such as Dennett, argue that we can discuss in terms of intentional stance provided it doesn't lead to question begging interpretations. Even though we don't understand "constructing meaning" clearly we can still advise students in certain ways that will help them develop something that they didn't have before. I think it's more useful and practical to operate on that basis, for example, Papert's advice on "learning to learn" which he called mathetics still stands up well. Something like these maxims:
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| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Bill Kerr writes, "I don't see how what you are saying is helpful at the practical level, the ultimate test for all theories." This is kind of like saying that the theory of gravity would not be true were there no engineers to use it to build bridges. This is absurd, of course. I am trying to describe how people learn. If this is not 'practical', well, that's not my fault. I didn't make humans. In fact, I think there are practical consequences, which I have attempted to detail at length elsewhere, and it would be most unfair to indict my own theoretical stance without taking that work into consideration. I have described, for example, the principles that characterize successful networks in my recent paper presented to ITForum (I really like Robin Good's presentation of the paper - much nicer layout and graphics). These follow from the theory I describe and inform many of the considerations people like George Siemens have rendered into practical prescriptions. And I have also expounded, in slogan form, a basic theory of practice: 'to teach is to model and demonstrate, to learn is to practice and reflect.' No short-cuts, no secret formulas, so simple it could hardly be called a theory. Not very original either. That, too, is not my fault. That's how people teach and learn, in my view. Which means that a lot of the rest of it (yes, including 'making meaning') is either (a) flim-flammery, or (more commonly) (b) directed toward something other than teaching and learning. Like, say power and control. Bill continues, "Stephen, your position on intentional stance sounds similar to Churchland's position on eliminative materialism." Quite right, and I have referred to him in some of my other work. "Other materialist philosophers, such as Dennett, argue that we can discuss in terms of intentional stance provided it doesn't lead to question begging interpretations." Well, yes, but this is tricky. It's kind of like saying, "Well, for the sake of convenience, we can talk about fairies and pixie dust as though they are the cause of the magical events in our lives." Call it "the magical stance". But now, when I am given a requirement to account for the causal powers of fairies, or when I need to show what pixie dust is made of (at the cost of my theory being incoherent) I am in a bit of a pickle (not a real pickle, of course). The same thing for "folk psychology" - the everyday language of knowledge and beliefs Dennett alludes to. What happens when these concepts, as they are commonly understood, form the the foundations of my theory? "Knowledge is justified true belief," says the web page. Except, it isn't. The Gettier problems make that pretty clear. So when pressed to answer a question like, 'what is knowledge' (as though it could be a thing) my reponse is something like "a belief we can't not have." Like 'knowing' where Waldo is in the picture after we've found him. It's like recognition. And what is 'a belief'? A certain set of connections in the brain. Except not that these statements entail that there is no particular thing that is 'a bit of knowledge' or 'a belief'. Yeah, you can talk in terms of knowledge and beliefs. But it requires a lot of groundwork before it becomes coherent. Bill continues, "Even though we don't understand 'constructing meaning' clearly we can still advise students in certain ways that will help them develop something that they didn't have before." What, like muscles? Except, they always had muscles. Better muscles? Well, ok. But then what do I say? "Practice." "I think it's more useful and practical to operate on that basis, for example, Papert's advice on 'learning to learn' which he called mathetics still stands up well." But what if they're wrong? What if they are exactly the wrong advice? Or moreover, what if they have to do with the structures of power and control that have developed in our learning environments, rather than having anything to do with learning at all? "Play is OK" has to do with power and control, for example. "Play fosters learning" is a different statement, much more controversial, and yet more descriptive, because play is (after all) practice. "The emotional precedes the cognitive." Except that I am told by psychologists that "the fundamental principle underlying all of psychology is that the idea - the thought - precedes the emotion." And so on. Each of these aphorisms sound credible, but when held up to the light, are not well-grounded. And hence, not practical. |
 | Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Are you saying then that people believe things and people know things and that they can instinctively learn the right thing? At a time when religious fundamentalism is rising fast, where there are networks proposing that the Holocaust has never happened, should we not be more critical about the nature of the networks? Do people not instinctively try to find likeminded people which means that false information and knowledge could be at the core of the networks? People can, and do, start networks to create information slanted in a certain direction already, eg Coca Cola pays bloggers to tell us that their product is fantastic and better than others. If we bring this down to earth in an educational context, how much guiding will be required by a tutor, what does a tutor of tomorrow have to be an expert in? Or won't we need tutors anymore? |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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What I am saying is that learning is instinctive, and that people will pretty reliably emulate the role models they are given. That's why one fanatic, given the chance to control a child's environment, breeds more fanatics, why one holocaust denier breeds more holocaust deniers. When looked at from the perspective of a social network, yes, it is true that holocaust deniers can more easily find each other on the net, and that, working as a network, they have a louder voice. But so do the rest of us. The danger we face - that we have always faced (and the holocaust is a blunt reminder of that) - is that one voice, or a small elite, will assume the role of arbiter of value, specifically to prevent people from learning the wrong things. The appalling frequency with which such individuals fail utterly in such roles demonstrates the need to allow all of society, and not a few privileged individuals, to adjudge truth and falsehood. Autocratic rule almost never produces an enlightened society, while democratic rule almost always does. The protections against slanted information, as described above, are, in my opinion, the properties that characterize successful networks: diversity, autonomy, openness, and connectedness. |
| Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Hi Stephen. Thanks for that. I agree. I am trying to come to terms with what this would mean for adult education. I think there is too much teaching in my blood to let go completely, but I have to admit it feels good to shake up the formal education system. Will this mean that we in education will be forced towards the ideals of Ivan illich, towards the deschooling of society? |
 | Re: What Connectivism Is |
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Thanks for the definition Stephen; we met at a conference in Regina when I gave you a ride to the conference centre. I liked your definition because to me it looks at learning as more than a language/logic process. I've been trying to encourage 360 degree assessment that looks at multiple aspects of learning not just paper tests, but it's a tough sell. This is particularly critical in medicine where I work because we've known for a long time that good test takers don't necessarily make good doctors. Studies have shown for example that constant research is a required skills for doctors and we are starting to teach the importance of quickly "knowing where." I talk a lot in my faculty training about "bulimic learning" where we force feed facts that students regurgitate on exams. The result is a student starved for deeper knowledge. Looking forward to your session. |
 | Re: a challenge to connectivism |
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Some theory: Social constructivism is aligned with online learning (Kanuka & Anderson, 1998). Online learning in this sense involves a community of learners, a social milieu which is grounded in the merging of Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s contributions. Social constructivism assumes that knowledge is grounded in the relationship between the knower and the known because knowledge is generated through social interaction. Vygotsky (1990) emphasized the critical importance of culture and the importance of the social context for cognitive development. Social experiences allow patterns to emerge and through conversational language these patterns are negotiated into meaning. Lave and Wenger’s (1991) notion of “Legitimate Peripheral Participation” provides a framework for induction into a community of practice. A key aspect of situated learning is the notion of the apprentice observing the ‘community of practice’. Lave and Wenger propose that the initial participation in a culture of practice can be observation from the periphery or legitimate peripheral participation. The participant moves from the role of observer, as learning and observation in the culture increase, to a fully functioning member. The progressive movement towards full participation enables the learner to piece together the culture of the group and establish their identity. “Knowing is inherent in the growth and transformation of identities and it is located in relations among practitioners, their practice, the artifacts of that practice, and the social organization…of communities of practice.” (Lave and Wenger, 1991, p 122). Similar to the idea of legitimate peripheral participation is Vygotsky’s (1990) “Zone of Proximinal Development”. This theoretical construct states that learning occurs best when an expert guides a novice from the novice’s current level of knowledge to the next level of knowledge. The level of knowledge that the learner can handle mentally depends on the individual. The novice’s level of knowledge moves towards that of the expert but would not reach as far as the experts, especially in the case of children. Bridging the zone of proximinal development construct with legitimate peripheral participation construct may be accomplished if one thinks of a zone in which the expert or mentor takes the learner from the peripheral status of knowing to a deeper status. This may be accomplished with or without intention as Lave and Wegner (1991) state: Legitimate peripheral participation is not itself an educational form, much less a pedagogical strategy or a teaching technique. It is an analytic viewpoint on learning, a way of understanding learning. We hope to make it clear that learning through legitimate peripheral participation takes place no matter which educational form provides a context for learning, or whether there is any intentional educational form at all. Indeed, this viewpoint makes a fundamental distinction between learning and intentional instruction (1991, p. 40). However, the expert scaffolds the environment to the extent in which the learner is engaged with the discourse and participates within the zone, and is drawn from a peripheral status to a more engaged status. The peripheral learner interacts with the mentor, other learners and peers within this zone. More able learners (peers) will work with the less able learner potentially allowing for socially constructed knowledge. This benefits both the more able and less able learners. The more able learner is able to confirm their understanding of the shared concepts developing tacit knowledge and the less able learner further constructs knowledge. And my thoughts on theory, connectivism and blogging: Through dialogue we negotiate meaning. Connected structures such as blogs allow a network of individuals to dialogue, exchanging ideas. As individuals grow and share their knowledge so do the connected members. Through dialogue the social construction of knowledge takes place. Why is blogging so powerful? When a person blogs there is no intention on teaching someone; however bloggers read each other’s blogs so legitimate peripheral participation takes place and bloggers comment on each other’s posts. A negotiation of meaning occurs through blogging dialogue and the social construction of knowledge emerges. With experts blogging on topics of interest a learner can peripherally participate by reading blogs. As the learner negotiates meaning and is able to alter their own knowledge constructs they can start to participate in blogging with the experts, moving from the peripheral of knowing to a deeper level of understanding. |
 | Re: a challenge to connectivism |
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Jeff said, "With experts blogging on topics of interest a learner can peripherally participate by reading blogs. As the learner negotiates meaning and is able to alter their own knowledge constructs they can start to participate in blogging with the experts, moving from the peripheral of knowing to a deeper level of understanding." This seems to suggest a centralized wisdom for which I think connectivism and blogging serve as counterexamples. My limited experience in blogging suggests to me that it is the cross-disciplinary meandering and hyper-linking that brings us deeper levels of understanding, as opposed to peripherally participating with a mentor or expert. In fact, I think innovation and meaningful learning/synthesis of ideas comes from the fringes... connectivism isn't about the theory- the great body of knowledge to be shared, it is about the ability for any Joe (or Joan) Schmo to meaningfully add to the learning conversation. (As I hope this Schmo has  ) |
 | Re: a challenge to connectivism |
| I think you have a good point, David. Connectivism is the idea of networked, distributed knowledge, as you say. Everyone contributes, everyone has a voice. We choose our own nodes, we create new connections, we discard old ones. We decide whose views to align ourselves with, and whose to reject. This is beginning to sound more and more like Kelly's personal construct psychology! |
| Re: a challenge to connectivism |
| I'm not sure why you say "as opposed to" when, in my experience, peripheral participation with more knowledgeable people (Vygotsky, etc) happens, as does cross-disciplinary discussion and hyper-links. It doesn't seem in opposition, just a couple of many different things that can-- and do-- happen every day? |
| Re: a challenge to connectivism |
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You are right Chirs, Instead of "as opposed to" I really should have said "as well as". This actually compliments the point I was trying to make... thank you! In another discussion started by Virginia Yonkers called Missing the Connection, George Siemens points us to: http://connectivism.ca/blog/2007/01/conversations_online.html I liked this point, and think that it fits well here: "Dialogue does not need to be direct in order to be effective. Dialogue of greatest value is what I call parallel, or dialogue of awareness. At this level, the comments and views of others are within our cognitive network (i.e. we know they exist) and their influence weighs in our reasoning and thought formation." I think that is the power of connectivism. |